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NOTES
LEGAL REGULATIONS OF MINER AND
SURFACE OWNER
This note deals with the reciprocal rights and duties of the owner
of the surface of private land and the owner of mines and mineral
rights under the land.
Mines on public land, matters of remedy, and rights and duties
which affect others than the surface and subjacent owners, are with-
out the scope of this note.
The ownership of the minerals under the land may be separated
either by exception or by grant.' In general, the relative rights and
duties of the surface and subjacent owner are said to be the same
IMarvin v. Brewster Iron Co., 55 N. Y. 538.
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whether the right of the mine owner is created by an exception in a
deed to the surface, or a grant of minerals, the grantor excepting
the surface. 2
Subjacent Support
Upon the separation of the ownership of the surface from the
ownership of the minerals thereunder, there is imposed on the owner
of the lower stratum, an implied duty to support the surface of the
land.3 This duty is absolute a and does not depend on whether the
mining is skillfully done,5 "but whether by reason of failure to
support it, the surface is injured."" In a case where the mineral is
situated so near the surface that it cannot be mined without destroy-
ing the surface, this fact might be a circumstance which would show
a waiver; but, if a waiver is not shown, then the mineral cannot be
taken.7
A person may own the mineral and be unable to get at it.8 In
the case of stone, for instance, which cannot be mined without dis-
turbing the surface of the soil and completely destroying the benefits
accruing to the owner of the surface, it is held that the owner may
only take out such stone as is exposed, from one cause or another, by
the removal of the soil.9
Although the courts sometimes phrase the rule: "The owner
of the estate in the minerals is entitled to remove only so much of
them as he can take without injury to the surface,"'1 it is generally
assumed that artificial support may be substituted for the natural
support furnished by the mineral."
2Hooper v. Dora Co., 95 Ala. 235; Wardell v. Watson, 93 Mo. 107; Baker
v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 219 Pa. 398.3Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. St. 81; Homer v. Watson, 79 Pa. St. 242;
Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. St. 429; Piedmont Coal Co. v. Kearny, 114 Md.
496; Southwest Mo. R. Co. v. Morning Hour Mining Co., 138 Mo. App. 129;
Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464; Donk Bros. Coal Co. v. Novero, 135 Ill. App. 633;
Dugdale v. Robertson, 3 Kay and J. (69 Eng. Reprint) 695. On thip general
question see notes in 24 Am. St. Rep. 555, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236, 13
L. R. A. 628.4Youghiogheny River Coal Co. v. Allegheny Nat. Bk., 211 Pa. 319, 69
L. R. A. 637.5West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 805;
Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co., 210 Ill. 460; Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa
114, 18 L. R A. (N. S.) 736.6Berkey v. Berwind, 229 Pa. 417.
'Bibby v. Bunch, 176 Ala. 585.
gPhillips v. Collinsville Granite Co., 123 Ga. 830; Silver Springs, etc., v.
Van Ness, 45 Fla. 559.
9Phillips v. Collinsvlle Granite Co., supra.
'oPer Boyd, C. J., in Piedmont v. Kearny, 114 Md. 496, supra.
llLivingston v. Moingona C. Co., 49 Iowa 369; note in 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
at p. 238.
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"'The word 'surface,' as used in the books, means, not merely the
gcumetrical superficies without thickness, but includes whatever
carth, soil, or land lies above and superincumbent on the mine.'
2
Therefore, one mine owner has a right to support from the owner
of a deeper mine below it.13
The subsurface owner is only obliged to support the surface in
the tate in which it was at the time of the severance of the estates,
or in the state for the purpose of putting it into which, the grant
was made. 14  The duty does not extend to additional buildings or
other burdens. Yet, when the burden on the surface is increased
and subsidence occurs, it will be assumed prima facie that the sub-
sidence would have occurred if no additional burden had been placed
ihereon."5.
In regard to springs on the surface which are diverted as a
result of ordinary mining, the rule is that the mine owner is not
liable :6 but if improper removal of surface support causes fissures,
or in any other manner causes a loss of water, there is a cause of
action.1
7
Of course, the right to support may be bartered away.18 This
may be and usually is done (if at all) in the contract which severs
the two estates.19 The intention to waive the right must appear
either expressly or by clear implication.20 "It must be expressed in
terms so plain as to admit of no doubt," is the way one court has
phrased it.2 1  A provision "releasing and discharging" the mine
owner from all liability for damages to the surfaie is held to be an
express waiver.2 2 So also is a reservation of "all the coal" with the
sole right to mine the same "without thereby incurring in any event
12Per Biddle, J., in Yandes v. Wright, 66 Ind. 319, 32 Am. Rep. 109.
'
3Yandes v. Wright, ubi supra.
14Marvin v. Brewster Iron Co., 55 N. Y. 538, supra.
15Western Ind. Coal Co. v. Brown, 36 Ind. App. 44; Wilms v. Jess, 94
Ill. 464, supra.16Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. St. 81, supra.17Piedmont Coal Co. v. Kearny, 114 Md. 496, distinguishing Coleman v.
Chadwick, supra; Pringle v. Vesta, 172 Pa. 438; see also Berkey v. Berwind,
220 Pa. 65, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 851.
"SMiles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 217 Pa. 449; Madden v. Lehigh Valley
Coal Co., 212 Pa. 63; Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485.19Cases in note 18, supra.2
°Walsh v. Kansas Fuel Co., 91 Kan. 310; Silver Springs 0. and G. 1.
Co. v. Van Ness, 45 Fla. 559; Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 149 Ill. App.
85; Butterly v. New Hucknell Colliery Co. [1910] A. C. 381, 79 L. J. Ch.
N. S. 411.21Catron v. South Butte Mining Co., 181 Fed. 941.22Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15; Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 234
Pa, 492.
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whatever any liability for injury caused or damage done to the
surface."
'2
On the other hand, the courts are reluctant to find a waiver by
implication. By the weight of American and English authority, a
sale of "all the coal, together with the right to remove the same,"
does not imply a waiver of surface support.2 4 Nor is a waiver im-
plied by a grant of "all the coal with the right to remove it,"
together with a provision that in mining the mineral owner "will do
as little damage to the surface as possible," or by like terms.2 5 These
words are held to refer to damage from sinking shafts or other uses
of the surface which are permitted .2  Even in a case where a lease
provided that no pillars in a coal mine should be withdrawn within
six hundred feet of the shaft, the court refused to find an implied
permission to take away surface support at other places. r .In a
lease of the right to mine "all the coal" under a certain tract, which
lease was to run for fifteen years "unless the coal in the land is
sooner mined out and exhausted," a waiver of surface support was
not implied. The clause for termination was held to refer to the
exhaustion of all the coal which could be mined without taking away
any of the surface support.
2 8
An alleged custom of miners to take away the ribs and pillars
of coal and allow the surface to fall has been held to be unreasonable
and void.2 9
Although the foregoing shows that it is difficult to make out a
case of waiver by implication, one was found in a case where the
intention appeared that a higher and a lower mine were to be worked
23Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 244 Pa. 592.24 Piedmont Coal Co. v. Kearny, 114 Md. 496; Robertson v. Coal Co., 172
Pa. St. 566; Burgner v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340; Harris v. Ryding, 5 M.
and W. 60. Griffin v. Fairmount, 59 W. Va. 480, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, is
contra but it has a strong dissenting opinion. The case note in the L. R. A.
criticizes the case and says that it departs from the current of authority.25 Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, supra; Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co.,
149 Ill. App. 85, supra, here the words were, "do as little damage to the
surface as it and they conveniently may." Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa.
St. 81, supra, in which case there was a grant of all the coal "and all
privileges necessary for the convenient working," etc., and "also all rights
and' privileges incident or usually appurtenant to the working of said
mines."
26Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, supra.
27Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464. The court said the only effect of the pro.
vision was to require the conduct of mining so that the coal would remain
accessible.2 8Mickle and Co. v. Douglas, 75 Iowa 78.29 Southwest M. R. Co. v. Morning Hour Mining Co., 138 Mo. App. 129;
Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. St. 81; Horner v. Watson, 79 Pa. St. 242.
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simultaneously and the manner in which they were intended to be
worked always caused a subsidence.3 0
Where it appears that the right of support was waived, the ques-
tion of negligence in mining is immaterial and the mineral need not
be removed carefully or in the usual course of mining.3 '
Penetration of the Soil
In a grant or reservation of minerals, the right of the mine
owner is implied to penetrate the surface by sinking one or more
shafts. 32 And iA case of oil rights, it is said that the fact that there
are no croppings of oil on the surface will not prevent the owner
from digging and tunneling to see if any exists below the surface.83
The express statement of other rights does not exclude the implica-
tion of the right to penetrate the surface ;34 the rule "Expressio unius
est cxclusio alterius" not being considered of sufficient force to over-
come the presumption that the right of penetration is granted.
The courts favor this implication and make it even where the
mine owner also owns adjoining lands which could be used, although
inconveniently. 5  However, the implication may be rebutted. For
instance, where part of the surface is reserved for cemetery pur-
poses, there is no implied right to sink shafts through that part.'6
Use of the Surface.
The mine owner also has the implied right to use the surface as
far as is reasonably necessary for the profitable and beneficial enjoy-
ment of his property ;37 and this is a question for the jury under the
facts and circumstances of each case.38  In the case of an oil lease,
it was held that the right becomes extinct when the purpose is ac-
complished or the work abandoned.39 The entrance upon the land
and necessary damage to the surface in preparation are only justi-
3 0Butterly v. New Hucknell Colliery Co. [1910] A. C. 381, supra.3 1Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 63. But compare Western
Indiana Coal Co. v. Brown, 36 Ind. App. 44; Livingston v. Moingona Coal
Co., 49 Iowa 36.32 Ewing v. Sandoval C. and M. Co., 110 Ill. 290; Baker v. Pittsburgh,
etc., R. R. Co., 219 Pa. 398; 27 Cyc. 688; Note in 24 Am. St. Rep. 555.
-
3 Dietz v. Mission Transfer Co., 95 Cal. 92.
'14 Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228; Wardell v. Watson, 93 Mo. 107; Marvin
v. Brewster Iron Co., 55 N. Y. 538.3 5WVardell v. Watson, 93 Mo. 107, supra.3 6 Montgomery v. Economy Fuel Co., 61 W. Va. 620.
37Gordon v. Million, 248 Mo. 155; Gordon v. Park, 219 Mo. 600; Turner
v Reynolds, 23 Pa. St. 199; 27 Cyc. 688. For the right to use the surface
in general, see note in 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 883, and note in 24 Am. St.
Rep. 555.3 8Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, supra; 27 Cyc. 689.3 9Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 InI. 9.
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fled if for the purpose of mining, and if the purpose is abandoned
before any actual exploration is made, it is held that the miner be-
comes a trespasser ab initio and that good faith in making the
preparations is no defence.
40
In regard to this right, in Marvin %,. Brewster Iron Co.,41 the
court said:
"The owner of the mine may keep pace with the progress of in-
vention and ingenuity so far as necessary to a profitable working of
his property in competition with rivals. Hence, he may adopt new
and improved methods which are usually availed of in the same busi-
ness when the use of them is necessary to him.
"He may have only that which is necessary, but may have that in
a convenient way."
If buildings are necessary, they may be erected ;42 but the mine
owner has the burden of proving that they are necessary. 43 In a
grant of the exclusive right to mine for and produce oil and "all
rights and privileges necessary for the proper use and enjoyment of
the lease," it was held that no right was implied to use the surface
to be sublet for residences and gardens, barns, etc., of employees.44
The right to build a tramway was implied under a grant of the
right "to mine and remove" coals. 45
Limiting the doctrine, it is held that the mine owner has no right
to use the plant erected on the surface of the land for loading and
transporting of coal mined on adjacent lands.40 A fortiori, this
would be true where there was a provision for the return of the
land after the coal was exhausted.47 The fact that it is "necessary,
practical or economical" to so mine makes no difference.48
Whether the mine owner is bound to bring up the minerals
through a shaft on the same land and not through an adjoining mine
is quite a different question. It was held that he was not so
bound even where the amount he paid for the mineral rights was
based on the amount of coal mined, and taking the coal up through
the adjoining shaft mingled it with other coal. 4
9
4oCoffindaffer v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., - W. Va. -, 52 L. P .A. (N. S.) 473.
4155 N. Y. 538.42Wardell v. Watson, 93 Mo. 107, supra.
43Bonson v. Jones, 89 Iowa 380.44Fowler v. Delaplain, 79 Ohio St. 279, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 100.
45Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 65 W. Va. 636.
46Hooper v. Dora Co., 95 Ala. 235.
47 Moore v. Price, 125 Iowa 353; McClosky v. Miller, 72 Pa. 151.48Brasfield v. Burnwell Coal Co., 180 Ala. 185.49Pruett v. O'Gara Coal Co., 165 Ill. App. 470.
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It ha, bcen hcht that a coal mine owner has no right to use the
surface for the conversion of the coal into coke. "His only right is
to mine and transport the coal in its first marketable state."' 0
The right to the use of the surface as far as necessary for mining
includes the right to dum 1p refuse from the mine below upon the
surface." Of course, this right does not justify dumping refuse
from mines under adjoining land.:,'
The right to cut timber for ue in mining or otherwise is not
generally implied. Where it i given for a certain purpose, it may
not be used for an), other purpose. 3
Use of Space From TVhich the Coal Has Been Removed
The general rule is that the grantee of coal in place has the
right to use the space left by the removal of the coal for the trans-
portation of coal from adjoining mines, while the grantee is still
working the first mine.5
Oil and Coal Rights in Conflict
In regard to the difficult question of the relative rights of the
owners of the coal and of the oil and gas under the same land, the
decisions offer little satisfaction.- In Chartiers Block Coal Co. v.
Mellon," Chief Justice Paxson says:
"While the right of the surface owner, to reach in some way his
underlying strata, is conceded, it involves too many questions affect-
ing the rights of property, and of injury to the underlying strata, to
be settled by the judiciary. It is a legislative, rather than a judicial
question."
R. R. N.
5°Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, supra.
51Dewey v. Great Lakes Coal Co., 236 Pa. 498.52Hooper v. Dora Co., 95 Ala. 235, supra.
-"Lewis v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 69 S. C. 364.
5Lillibridge v. Lackawanna, 143 Pa. St. 293, 13 L. R. A. 627; Schobert
v. Pittsburg Coal and Mining Co., 254 Ill. 474; New York, etc., v. Hillside,
etc, 225 Pa. 211; note in 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 826; note in 24 Am. St. Rep., at
p. 557. As to copyhold lands in England, the rule is different. There, the
lord of the manor may use the space for removing coal from other lands
within the same manor, but not from lands outside the manor; Eardly v.
Granville, 3 Ch. D. 826; Bowser v. McLean, 2 De Gex, F., and J. (45 English
Reprint) 415.
5But see: Rend v. Venture Oil Co., 48 Fed. 248; Chartiers Block Coal
Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286.
5152 Pa. 286, supra.
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